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Abstract 
State and Federal legislation governing health information and privacy in Australia is complex 
and relatively untested, causing confusion amongst database custodians as to what conduct is 
required. Some database custodians believe that providing privacy will allay public anxiety and 
consequently support research. Others argue that data managers have become fearful of litigation 
and that this will restrict the access of researchers to data. Two of the significant ethical issues to 
be considered are the right to privacy, and whether using information poses a risk to data subjects. 
Data custodians have sought to address concerns about privacy in two main ways. The first is by 
seeking informed consent from those whose data is collected. There are significant, but not insur-
mountable, practical difficulties in seeking consent from large numbers of individuals.  The second 
way of addressing privacy concerns has been through security measures which are designed to 
reduce risks to data subjects. These measures are often nominated as a response to privacy require-
ments; however, they do not necessarily offer the opportunity to consent to information disclosures. 
In this paper we present a review of the current literature on possible responses of database 
custodians to demands for increased privacy. We outline a variety of examples and responses, some 
of which have the effect of restricting research, while others are enabling research to proceed with 
greater privacy protection in place. We argue that finding ways to proceed with research while 
protecting privacy requires attention to a range of factors. There are challenges both in engaging 
populations about consent procedures, and in encouraging the use by researchers and health care 
professionals of technical solutions where these are available. 
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Australian states. These changes, in 
addition to pre existing common law 
protection for confidential information, 
have produced a complex legal envi-
ronment in Australia which is relatively 
untested. Not surprisingly, health data 
custodians have been confused as to 
the most appropriate response. There 
has been considerable professional 
discussion concerning what conduct 
is required to comply with the various 
requirements of different statutes. The 
response of database custodians to 
1 Introduction 
Legislation expanding the control 
which individuals may exercise over the 
use and disclosure of personal (and 
especially health) information has 
placed new demands upon registries 
and other database custodians. New 
legislation includes amendment of the 
Commonwealth Privacy Act to apply 
to all health information in the private 
sector and introduction of health spe-
cific privacy legislation in a number of 
demands for increased privacy protec-
tion has been mixed, while the ultimate 
impact on research productivity is not 
yet clear. 
In this paper we acknowledge the 
problems which health data custodi-
ans confront in providing privacy pro-
tection, consider the ethical issues 
involved and review some of the re-
sponses of database custodians. The 
main responses have been to seek in-
dividual consent for the inclusion and 
use of data in registries and databases, 
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and to devise business rules which 
reduce the likelihood that clinical data 
can be traced back to the individuals 
who were its source. 
2 Data protection may 
restrict or enable 
research 
Some registry custodians support 
the practice of giving individuals the 
opportunity to consent, on the 
grounds that public confidence is nec-
essary if research is to proceed. James 
Morrow has said of the UK Epilepsy 
and Pregnancy Register that while 
‘case ascertainment would probably be 
higher if informed consent was not 
necessary, this is an inevitable trade 
off to maintain patients’ trust’ (Mor-
row 2001). In their analysis of the statu-
tory regulation of confidentiality and 
privacy affecting the National Cancer 
Institute Breast Cancer Surveillance 
Consortium, which has a centralised 
register of mammographic data in the 
United States, Carney et al point out 
that the public are increasingly aware 
of instances of misuse of health 
records. They argue that providing 
privacy guarantees is the antidote to 
public mistrust: 
For research studies to gain the par-
ticipation needed by the public, the 
confidentiality of research data must 
be honored and protected. Otherwise 
it will be impossible to conduct research 
(Carney, Geller et al. 2000 p 377). 
Other health data custodians have 
voiced their concern at the impact 
which increasing privacy protection 
will have on research. A case report 
from custodians of a large data reposi-
tory in the USA notes that 
Recent deliberations over Health In-
surance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (HIPAA) requirements have 
cast a specter of concern over any sec-
ondary uses of data from electronic 
medical records systems (Moehr and 
Daniel 1998 p 394). 
Custodians of medical data in the 
United Kingdom complain of confu-
sion caused by the Data Protection Act 
(Stroble, Cave et al. 2000; Coleman, 
Evans et al. 2003). Database custodi-
ans are said to be “fearful of litigation 
if they allow any access for research 
or even audit without each patient’s 
informed consent” (Peto and Fletcher 
2004). 
Researchers report that some custo-
dians of health data have become “re-
luctant to continue supplying data to 
researchers” with the result that epi-
demiological research “is threatened 
by too rigid and inconsistent interpre-
tation of the Data Protection Act” 
(Evans, McNaughton et al. 2001 p 672). 
There are reports of increasing diffi-
culty in identifying suitable research 
subjects for recruitment (Redsell and 
Cheater 2001) and complaints that com-
pliance with the Data Protection Act is 
expensive and time consuming, drains 
resources (Evans, McNaughton et al. 
2001) and acts as an obstacle to re-
search (Peto and Fletcher 2004). 
3 The ethical issues 
From an ethical perspective, there are 
three main issues at stake. One is the 
important benefit to society gained 
from medical research. Preservation of 
this public good may justify forgoing 
some other public or private benefits. 
This is the position taken by the Na-
tional Health and Medical Research 
Council in its ethical guidelines on re-
search (NHMRC 1999). 
A second is the right to privacy, sup-
ported by legislation, which empha-
sises the importance of people being 
able to decide freely who should have 
access to their personal information. 
The right to privacy is recognised by 
researchers and custodians who accept 
that most patients wish to exercise 
control over whether their health in-
formation is used in research (Fletcher, 
Marriott et al. 2004; Billings, Kohn et 
al. 1992; Sankar, Mora et al. 2003). 
The third ethical issue revolves 
around whether or not using informa-
tion poses a risk of harm to those whose 
information is used. Some researchers 
doubt that there are real risks to data 
subjects from which they should be 
protected (Evans, McNaughton et al. 
2001 p 672), while others note that there 
have been misuses of health informa-
tion (Marwick 1996). In 1997 the Brit-
ish Medical Journal published two 
articles which defended the need for 
epidemiological research data gather-
ing without patients’ consent (Smith 
1997; Doyal 1997). This stimulated 
many letters to the editor. Researchers 
argued that consent should not be dis-
pensed with, but that instead research 
should be better designed (Pfeffer and 
Alderson 1997). Journalists pointed 
out that consent is not obtained in 
many research projects and presented 
findings that the US Food and Drug 
Administration had identified over 
2000 instances of research proceeding 
in the absence of consent during its 
inspections of clinical trials (Epstein 
and Sloat 1997). 
4 Responses to the 
demands of privacy 
protection 
At present there are two main ways 
in which data custodians and research-
ers are responding to the increasing 
demands for privacy protection. The 
first is to seek informed consent from 
those whose data is subject to collec-
tion in a registry or other health data-
base. Data subjects are given 
information about any intended uses 
and offered the opportunity to refuse 
inclusion of their data. This response 
meets ethical requirements as well as 
complying with legal requirements in 
many jurisdictions. The second re-
sponse is to develop mechanisms for 
ensuring protection of privacy, on the 
grounds that privacy is not breached 
if the data are sufficiently de-identified 
and protected such that they can not 
be linked back to individuals. This re-
sponse does not allow data subjects 
to control the uses of their data, but it 
does minimise the potential for indi-
viduals to be harmed. 
5 Consent 
Custodians of both research 
databases and clinical information sys-
tems have commented on the practical 
problems associated with seeking con-
sent from large numbers of individu-
als. Database custodians have argued 
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that seeking consent from individuals 
for inclusion of health data in popula-
tion research would result in unrepre-
sentative sampling (AlShahi and 
Warlow 2001), and that it is impractical 
(Holman 2001), or undesirable (Evans, 
McNaughton et al. 2001) or both 
(Finkelstein 1999). 
Despite the difficulties, some data 
managers have set themselves to the 
task of communicating with large num-
bers of people. For example, leaflets 
were used in the UK to inform local 
residents of a local record linkage 
project involving the records of three 
general practices, two healthcare 
trusts, an ambulance service and a so-
cial service. The leaflets were distrib-
uted to 88,000 households (approx 
225,000 residents). Only 82 calls were 
received by the advertised information 
line, while the information website re-
ceived 1306 hits in six months. Partici-
pants were not asked to consent, but 
were offered the opportunity to with-
draw their data from the project. A to-
tal of 10 individuals asked for their 
records to be excluded (Adams, 
Budden et al. 2004). 
There is some doubt, however, that 
household leafleting is an effective 
public education method. In a similar 
project in South Staffordshire involv-
ing a population of 60,000 households, 
follow up surveys were conducted with 
general practice patients and shoppers 
in the area. While there were no re-
quests to opt out of this project, and a 
large majority (80%) felt comfortable 
with it, less than half were aware that 
their data had been networked and only 
15% understood that they could opt 
out, despite the public education cam-
paign. People were relatively uninter-
ested in health data linkage, making it 
a challenge to ensure that they were 
made aware of these data linkage 
projects (Adams, Budden et al. 2004). 
The Mayo Clinic’s collection of over 
5 million medical records have been 
used to provide data for tens of thou-
sands of studies, and the Rochester 
Epidemiology Project which links these 
records with those from other treat-
ment centers has supported more than 
a thousand publications describing the 
natural history of various diseases 
(Melton 1997). The advent of federal 
privacy legislation (the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability 
Act 2000) in the United States brought 
with it the requirement for individual 
patient consent and the Mayo Clinic 
sought this. At that time 94% of cur-
rent Mayo Clinic patients (and 97% at 
a partner institution) agreed to provide 
written consent for the use of their 
records. This suggests two things; 
one, that a large proportion of patients 
will consent if given the opportunity; 
and two, that the logistical problems 
of obtaining consent from a large 
number of potential research partici-
pants can be overcome. 
From these examples, it would ap-
pear that a large proportion of people 
in the general population (at least in 
the UK and the USA) will not object to 
health data linkage for clinical care and 
for research purposes. 
The practical problems identified by 
database custodians are how to pro-
vide information to large numbers of 
people, how to obtain and record con-
sent from them and how to provide ef-
fective opt out options for the few 
individuals who do refuse consent. 
Model protocols for transferring health 
and consent information between 
heath facilities which automatically 
protect transferred health information 
according to the patients’ consent 
conditions are in development. An ex-
ample is the eConsent model described 
by O’Keefe et al. This model captures 
patients’ expressed wishes regarding 
who can access their information, at-
taches these to existing or new elec-
tronic records (or parts of the record), 
and applies the consent conditions to 
grant or deny access requests 
(O’Keefe, Greenfield et al. 2005). 
Reducing the participation rate in 
large population based studies by 
omitting those who decline to consent 
or those who cannot provide consent 
(for example because they cannot be 
traced, or have died) can undermine 
the meaningfulness of epidemiological 
research. Researchers faced with the 
prospect of being required to seek in-
dividual consent to health data link-
age have put forward examples of 
research designs which would be frus-
trated (Bruinsma, Venn et al. 2000). 
This finding is supported by other 
studies indicating that those who seek 
to opt out have different demographic 
profiles from those who consent to 
have their health data linked for re-
search purposes (Woolf, Rothemich et 
al. 2000; Yawn, Yawn et al. 1998). For 
example, voluntary recruitment into the 
registry of the Canadian Stroke Net-
work resulted in a seriously biased 
group and the assessment that this 
registry will never be able to provide a 
representative data set (Tu, Willison 
et al. 2004). 
Some large population studies have, 
however, obtained consent and found 
few differences between those who 
consented and those who did not. The 
Norwegian Women and Cancer Study 
invited 179,388 women to complete 
their questionnaire. Response rates 
were only 45 to 60% (depending on 
age group) but there were few demo-
graphic differences between those who 
did and those who did not participate 
when they were compared using a na-
tional population register. This re-
search group concluded that there was 
no major selection bias introduced by 
voluntary participation. 
6 Obscuring links 
between individuals and 
data 
An alternative to seeking informed 
consent is to develop systems that 
protect privacy during data linkage. 
Security measures which are designed 
to reduce risks to data subjects who 
have not been offered the opportunity 
to consent are often nominated as pri-
vacy protecting  measures (Berman 
2002; Evans, McNaughton et al. 2001). 
Administrative procedures or busi-
ness rules for record linkage processes 
offer a high level of security to the 
stored data, although reverse engi-
neering can be employed to reassem-
ble information into a form which can 
be identified with individuals (Sweeney 
2002). One methodology involves the 
separation of personal identifiers from 
clinical information and their separate 
encryption by the reporting clinician, 
submission of these data to a “trusted 
third party” who allocates an identi-
fier specific to the paired data items 
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and forwards personal identifiers and 
clinical data to separate repositories. 
Clinical data from disparate databases 
can only be linked by the “trusted third 
party” using the unique identifier 
which it allocated. Neither researchers 
nor the specific disease registers are 
provided with personal identifiers 
(Churches 2003). 
This system requires legal protection 
and financial support from government 
and reflects many of the elements of 
the work of the Western Australian 
Data Linkage Unit (Kelman, Bass et al. 
2002). In Western Australia the custo-
dians of disease registries and health 
databases that contain both personal 
identifiers and clinical information sign 
memoranda of understanding which 
authorise a trusted third party (the 
Linkage Unit) to identify data concern-
ing the same individual across differ-
ent databases. The Linkage Unit 
allocates unique anonymous identifi-
ers for each individual which are spe-
cific to the particular research project. 
The researcher then uses the unique 
identifier to obtain clinical data directly 
from each database and is the only 
person to hold the complete file of 
linked clinical data. Researchers hold 
clinical but not identifying data, while 
the linkage unit accesses personally 
identifying information but not clini-
cal data. 
Other protocols have been proposed 
which utilise public key cryptography 
to obscure identifying information dur-
ing data linkage between two or more 
data bases (Agrawal, Evfimievski et al. 
2003).  While these protocols cannot 
protect against collusion between a 
researcher and a database to disclose 
identifying information, they do offer 
a high level of security. Protocols have 
also been developed which allow data 
linkage between databases without 
disclosure of identifying information 
to any party outside the originating 
data source, or which allow extraction 
of a cohort of data from a database 
without revealing membership of the 
cohort to the source database 
(O’Keefe, Gu et al. 2004). 
All of these methodologies to ob-
scure data minimise the risk that health 
information will be disclosed. Reduc-
ing risks to data subjects may enhance 
their confidence and address their con-
cerns, but it does not extend control 
to them over the use and distribution 
of their data. 
7 Conclusion 
Database custodians confront prob-
lems as they comply with privacy and 
data protection requirements. They 
may respond in a variety of ways. Some 
responses have the effect of restrict-
ing research, other responses enable 
research to proceed with privacy pro-
tection in place. Responses revolve 
around either seeking consent, or us-
ing data management systems which 
make it difficult to trace individuals 
from data. 
The technical solutions for protect-
ing privacy are complex, which  may 
be one reason why they are not always 
utilised. Information system develop-
ers have observed that functions such 
as user authentication and data trans-
fer audit may be ignored by health care 
providers, even when these are avail-
able (Moehr and Daniel 1998). 
In summary, there is unlikely to be a 
single solution to the challenges posed 
by performing data-based research 
with adequate privacy protections. 
Data custodians and researchers may 
need to tailor their responses to types 
of population or register, or to specific 
research needs. There are difficulties 
in engaging the population in debate 
about data uses, and in getting re-
searchers and health care profession-
als to use technical solutions where 
these are available. Meeting these chal-
lenges to ensure high ethical stand-
ards in research involving databases 
and registers requires time and effort, 
but is necessary to maintain public 
support for research. 
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